

Joint Maritime Information Center

Update 107 to JMIC Advisory Note:

01 March – 22 October 2026

Regional Tension - Impact on Maritime Security

Area of Concern:

Middle East Maritime Region

JMIC# 001-26

ICOD: 221300 UTC

Regional Threat Level: SEVERE

1. Confirmed Maritime Security Incidents List since last report

Date	Vessel	Vessel Type	Event Type	Location	Narrative
20 Oct 2026 UKMTO 178-26	CHLOE	Tanker	Military interaction	Arabian Sea	UKMTO received a report that on 19 Oct a tanker, identified by the IMO as the CHLOE, was subject to interaction with military forces as part of ongoing blockade activity in the region, approx. 121 NM east of Duqm, Oman. No crew injuries reported.
21 Oct 2026 UKMTO 179-26 NAVAREA IX 396/26	AL DASMA	Tanker	Attack	Strait of Hormuz	UKMTO received a report from Omani CG that on 21 Oct an oil tanker, identified by NAVAREA IX as the AL DASMA, was struck by an unknown projectile approx. 11 NM west of Bukha, Oman. The fire was extinguished and NAVAREA IX reported that the vessel was anchored approx. 1.3 NM west of Bukha. All crew reported safe and no environmental damage reported
21 Oct 2026 UKMTO 180-26	MT SOYIA	Tanker	Attack	Northern Arabian Gulf	UKMTO received a report that on 20 Oct the tanker MT SOYIA was struck by an unknown projectile approx. 30 NM southeast of Al Faw, Iraq. All crew reported safe; no vessel or environmental damage reported



2. Operational Summary – Last 96 Hours

2A. Arabian Gulf

One attack was reported to UKMTO in this period (UKMTO 180-26). This is the first reported attack in the northern Arabian Gulf off Iraq in the reporting period and the fifth attack inside the Gulf since 07 Oct (UKMTO 158-26, 160-26, 174-26, 175-26).

Traffic flows continued, with anchorage congestion high across the region.

Navigational system interference remained elevated and stable, concentrated in the western Gulf from Kuwait/Khafji via Dammam to Bahrain, with further indications on the Dubai – Ras Al Khaimah coast and at Fujairah/Khor Fakkan.

2B. Strait of Hormuz

One attack was reported in this period (UKMTO 179-26).

IRGC attacks, attempted attacks, and/or harassment activity persisted including UAV overflight, targeted surveillance of merchant shipping, and occasional VHF hailing. These actions continue to demonstrate Iran's intent to assert presence along key transit lanes and maintain pressure on transiting vessels.

Commercial traffic through the Strait of Hormuz remained at reduced levels compared to the 2025 baseline. Independent tracking data indicated single digit transits, while US NCAGS data indicated US assisted traffic flows averaging approximately 28 vessel transits per day.

2C. Gulf of Oman

No confirmed attacks or disruptions were reported in this period.

Naval presence remained elevated due to blockade enforcement activity. According to the latest official CENTCOM figures (17 October), 138 commercial vessels had been redirected; four vessels had been disabled as of 10 – 11 October during blockade enforcement. No further CENTCOM blockade enforcement action was announced in this period.

Vessels were expected to respond promptly to military queries and maintain AIS-on unless constrained by security threats. Operators continued to exercise caution due to regional strike activity and ongoing IRGC monitoring of shipping in adjacent waters.

2D. Arabian Sea

No confirmed attacks were reported in this period. On 19 Oct a tanker was subject to interaction with blockade forces approx. 121 NM east of Duqm, Oman (UKMTO Advisory 178-26). Naval forces continued routine patrols, and commercial traffic was transiting without significant disruption.

2E. Gulf of Aden (No change)

No confirmed attacks or disruptions were reported in this period. Commercial traffic remained relatively steady in the Gulf of Aden.

2F. Southern Red Sea & Bab el Mandeb

No confirmed attacks or disruptions were reported in this period. Traffic remains below the 20 July Houthi selective embargo. Commercial traffic remained relatively steady in the Bab el Mandeb. Continued Saudi-led Coalition airstrikes specifically against Houthi fuel facilities in Yemen, concurrent with ongoing Houthi missile and drone launches directed at Saudi Arabia, over the preceding 96 hours.



Bab el-Mandeb remains open to commercial traffic but is considered as volatile. Houthi statements continue to assert that non-Saudi commercial shipping may transit safely.

2G. Somali Coast and Somali Basin (No change)

No confirmed attacks or disruptions were reported in this period. One merchant vessel remains hijacked since the date of initial incident reporting:

- MT ASANA, a Tanzanian-flagged product/chemical tanker, was hijacked on 17 July 2026 approximately 65 NM southwest of Mukalla, Yemen, while carrying oil products.

2H. Northern Red Sea & Suez Canal (No change)

No confirmed attacks or disruptions were reported in this period. Maritime traffic in the Northern Red Sea and Suez Canal held steady over the last 96 hours.

2I. Eastern Mediterranean (No change)

No confirmed attacks or disruptions were reported in this period – consistent with the persistent baseline.



3. Regional Threat Overview

JMIC Threat Scale: ● Low | ● Moderate | ● Substantial | ● Severe | ● Critical

Region	Threat Level	Notes
Arabian Gulf	SUBSTANTIAL	Due to recent Iranian attacks, the threat level in the Arabian Gulf remains SUBSTANTIAL. Navigation interference has also increased. An attack is a strong possibility.
Strait of Hormuz	SEVERE	Due to recent Iranian attacks, the threat level remains SEVERE, with deliberate hostile action considered as highly likely under current conditions. Navigation interference persists, and mariners are advised to remain vigilant for attempted mining within and adjacent to the TSS. IRGC attacks, hailing, and routing pressure continue, particularly for AIS-on vessels.
Gulf of Oman	MODERATE	The U.S. naval blockade remains enforced, with ongoing monitoring, hailing, and verification queries, particularly near approaches to Iranian ports. Enforcement activity poses no direct impact to neutral shipping transits in the Gulf of Oman. Electronic interference continues to present a credible concern for mariners.
Arabian Sea	MODERATE	Residual conflict-linked risk persists, but no attacks have been reported, and current indicators suggest no imminent change to the threat environment.
Gulf of Aden	SUBSTANTIAL	Due to piracy-related events and Houthi rhetoric and attacks, the threat level remains SUBSTANTIAL, with a strong possibility of a maritime security incident in coastal approaches, transit corridors, and established small-craft areas.
Bab el-Mandeb / Southern Red Sea	SUBSTANTIAL	Due to Houthi attacks on vessels and maritime infrastructure in the Southern Red Sea and territorial gains in Yemen along the Red Sea, the threat level remains SUBSTANTIAL. Based on the recent attacks, sustained intent against Saudi-affiliated interests, and maintained capability, additional attacks are a strong possibility.
Somali Coast / Somali Basin	MODERATE	PAG activity remains possible; the southwest monsoon subsided on 15 October, and skiff operations further offshore are more feasible.
Northern Red Sea / Suez Canal	MODERATE	Suez Canal operations remain normal. Periodic Electro-magnetic Interference (EMI) remains possible.
Eastern Mediterranean	LOW	Due to a lack of security incidents, the threat level remains LOW. Localized EMI disruptions persist, and regional naval presence remains consistent.

JMIC Regional Threat Levels

Threat Level	Definition
Low	An attack is highly unlikely
Moderate	An attack is possible but not likely
Substantial	An attack is a strong possibility
Severe	An attack is highly likely
Critical	An attack is almost certain



4. Maritime Incidents & Traffic Assessment

4A. Confirmed Vessel Incidents since 01 March

Total of 155 incidents since 01 March; two incidents since the last report (UKMTO 179-26 and 180-26). UKMTO advisory 178-26 (military interaction) is not counted as an attack.

4B. Infrastructure Incidents (Last 96 Hours)

The overall risk remains MODERATE, driven by the potential for an increase in kinetic activity against ports, terminals and offshore installations along the Iranian, Yemeni and Saudi coasts.

No other attack on ports, terminals, offshore platforms, oil and gas loading facilities or subsea infrastructure was reported in this period.

4C. Traffic Trends

- Strait of Hormuz:
 - Historical average: ~138 vessels/day (2025 baseline)
 - U.S. – facilitated SoH transits 18 – 21 October (past 96 hours): 111

** Metrics are drawn from two separate sources: U.S. NCAGS data reflecting U.S.-facilitated Strait of Hormuz transits only, and S&P Maritime/SeaVision data reflecting non-facilitated vessel traffic for cargo-carrying vessels above 1,000 deadweight tons, excluding vessels calling Iranian ports adjacent to the Strait of Hormuz.*

- Bab el-Mandeb:
 - Historical average: ~61 vessels/day (2023 baseline)
 - Vessel transits 18 – 21 October (past 96 hours): 136

** Metrics are drawn from S&P Maritime for cargo-carrying vessels above 1,000 deadweight tons.*

4D. Port & Anchorage Congestion

Congestion remains high and is driven by restricted transit, not port capacity. On 22 October internal tracking showed approximately 201 vessels at anchor in the vicinity of Fujairah/Khor Fakkan (down from the 18 October peak of 217), approximately 188 off Dubai/Jebel Ali to Ras Al Khaimah, approximately 53 in the vicinity of Musandam/Sohar, and approximately 22 inactive off Bandar Abbas/Qeshm.

Gulf of Oman congestion eased from the 18 October peak without a mass departure, and Khor Fakkan shows no clearing-out after the 18 October tug attack in its approaches (UKMTO 177-26). Approximately 501 vessels were waiting outside the Strait of Hormuz, against single-digit AIS-visible transits; the backlog is expected to persist. All tracking AIS-dark vessels excluded. Periodic repositioning remains advisable in all areas.

4E. GNSS / AIS Interference

Interference in the Arabian Gulf is elevated and stable, concentrated in the western Gulf from Kuwait/Khafji via Dammam to Bahrain, with further indications on the Dubai – Ras Al Khaimah coast and at Fujairah/Khor Fakkan. Windward recorded 211 jammed vessels and 760 false STS events in the Gulf and Gulf of Oman on 20 October, confirming effects on shipping. The Strait of Hormuz and Gulf of Oman remained at the established high baseline.

No new specific UKMTO, MARAD, NAVCENT, or NAVAREA IX GNSS/EMI notices were issued 18 – 22 October. Baseline advisories remain in force.



5. Outlook (24–48 Hours)

5A. Arabian Gulf

The threat level remains SUBSTANTIAL, with continued navigational system interference and demonstrated kinetic threat and wider regional military activity continued to warrant caution. Outlook 24–48 hours: five attacks inside the Gulf since 07 October (UKMTO 158-26, 160-26, 174-26, 175-26, and UKMTO 180-26) show that attacks remain a strong possibility throughout the Arabian Gulf, including at anchorages and STS areas off Iraq. GNSS interference is expected to remain elevated in the western Gulf. Electronic interference presents a credible concern in the central and southern Arabian Gulf. The operating environment requires heightened situational awareness throughout all approaches.

Vessels stationary for extended periods, or maintaining AIS-on while static, may face elevated targeting risk.

5B. Strait of Hormuz

The threat level remains SEVERE, with deliberate attacks considered highly likely under current conditions. Outlook 24–48 hours and beyond: further attacks are highly likely. Transits are expected to remain low.

Vessels transiting with AIS-on can expect elevated targeting risk and receive directed hails instructing them to divert toward the northern Iranian-controlled route.

Maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz is expected to remain at reduced levels, compared to the 2025 baseline, across both the northern Iranian-controlled route and the southern Omani corridor. Operator caution should continue, driven by a series of vessel attacks, ongoing U.S. blockade enforcement, and elevated regional tension.

The U.S. blockade of Iranian ports continues to be enforced. Unauthorized entry or departure may result in interception or force. Neutral transit is permitted, but vessels should expect visit-and-search checks, strong U.S. naval presence, persistent IRGC monitoring, and increased VHF hails. A 30 NM standoff from U.S. units is advised to reduce misidentification risk.

A vetted humanitarian-cargo exemption remains in place but requires submission to NAVCENT NCAGS. Approved vessels may transit to Iranian ports but remain subject to inspection and may not load cargo in Iran beyond fuel and stores.

Industry Guidance for Safe Management of Vessel Transit through the Strait of Hormuz:

<https://www.maritimeglobalsecurity.org/media/vkaa3pjr/2026-05-20-guidance-strait-of-hormuz.pdf>

5C. Gulf of Oman

The threat level remains MODERATE. Vessels can expect persistent IRGC monitoring and routing pressure in western portion of the Gulf of Oman; however, further east/south, attacks are considered possible but not likely. Residual risk diminishes with distance from the primary concentration of IRGC activity and with distance from Musandam / Jask. Outlook 24–48 hours: approximately 201 vessels are at anchor IVO Fujairah/Khor Fakkan and congestion is expected to persist; the 18 October attack in the Khor Fakkan approaches shows the anchorage concentration remains exposed.

A U.S. naval blockade remains enforced, with ongoing monitoring, hailing, and verification queries, particularly near approaches to Iranian ports. Unauthorized entry or departure may result in interception or force. Neutral transit is permitted, but vessels should expect visit-and-search checks, strong U.S. naval presence, persistent IRGC monitoring, and occasional hails. A 30 NM standoff from U.S. units is advised, as well as ensuring continuous monitoring of VHF Channel 16, to reduce misidentification risk.



Electronic interference continues to present a credible concern. The operating environment requires heightened situational awareness throughout all approaches.

5D. Arabian Sea (No change)

The threat level remains MODERATE. The regional posture remains stable, with no confirmed maritime attacks reported. Residual risk persists due to broader regional tensions; an attack is possible but not likely, and current indicators do not suggest any shift toward increased threat levels in the near term. Outlook 24–48 hours: no attack was reported in this period; further interaction with military forces enforcing the blockade is possible, and no change is expected.

5E. Gulf of Aden

The threat level remains SUBSTANTIAL. Attacks and piracy-related activity remain a strong possibility in the Gulf of Aden and IRTC. Small-craft groups retain close-approach capability, and Pirate Action Groups can still board and divert merchant vessels as monsoon restrictions ease. Outlook 24–48 hours: no incident was reported after 17 October (UKMTO 176-26), but with the southwest monsoon subsided, further skiff approaches are possible. Skiff operations, including those launched from dhow or hijacked fishing-vessel mother ships, are likely to become more feasible across the Gulf of Aden and the IRTC.

5F. Southern Red Sea / Bab el Mandeb

The threat level remains SUBSTANTIAL. Houthi messaging consistently frames the 20 July maritime blockade as selective against assets considered as Israeli-, Saudi-, or Yemeni internationally recognized government-linked. Houthi forces retain coastal presence and strike capability along the southern Red Sea approaches following September territorial gains. Saudi-backed Yemeni government forces launched a counter-offensive in early October and have claimed gains in the Bab el-Mandeb approaches; the precise extent of control remains contested and unverified by independent sources.

Outlook 24–48 hours: no confirmed attack on shipping was reported in this period; the last confirmed Houthi attack on a merchant vessel was on 24 August. Retaliatory action against Saudi-, Israeli- or Yemeni government-linked shipping remains possible. Attacks in the wider area remain a strong possibility but expansion into indiscriminate targeting of all commercial shipping remains unlikely. Traffic will continue at reduced but stable levels.

Mariners should maintain heightened security postures, implement speed and timing mitigation, minimize predictable AIS behavior in the narrows, and prepare for short-notice navigational directives.

5G. Somali Coast and Somali Basin

The threat level remains MODERATE as PAG activity persists across the Somali Coast and Somali Basin. The southwest monsoon withdrew on 15 October. Residual opportunistic piracy risk persists in nearshore Somali waters and the Gulf of Aden, where small-boat activity remains feasible. Pirate Action Groups retain the capability to board and divert merchant vessels along the Somali coast, IRTC approaches, and adjacent Gulf of Aden lanes. Outlook 24–48 hours and beyond: With the inter-monsoon period under way, skiff operations further offshore are becoming more feasible, and use of dhows or hijacked fishing vessels as mother ships could extend Pirate Action Group range.

5H. Northern Red Sea / Suez

The threat level remains MODERATE. Periodic EMI and GNSS disruptions are likely to continue in the area. The 16 October intercepted missile aimed at Yanbu establishes that Saudi Red Sea terminals remain within Houthi weapons range. Outlook 24–48 hours: Minimal AIS usage at Yanbu



berths and approaches is expected to persist. The Suez Canal will remain functional in both directions with no interruption.

5I. Eastern Mediterranean

The threat level remains LOW for security risks to merchant shipping, with localized EMI/GNSS as the principal published hazard. Outlook 24–48 hours: a security incident against merchant shipping is highly unlikely, and GNSS interference on the Levant coast will continue.

Naval presence remains, and vessels should maintain prudent separation from military units. No change – consistent with the persistent baseline.



ANNEXES

Transit comparisons

CARGO VESSELS TRANSITS COMPARISON


Date	15-Oct	16-Oct	17-Oct	18-Oct	19-Oct	20-Oct	21-Oct
SoH E	0	2	0	1	1	2	3
SoH W	1	2	0	0	3	0	2
SoH Total	1	4	0	1	4	2	5
BAM NW	6	17	10	4	10	19	9
BAM SE	10	10	13	8	16	9	10
BAM Total	16	27	23	12	26	28	19


TANKERS (ALL TYPES) TRANSITS COMPARISON

Date	15-Oct	16-Oct	17-Oct	18-Oct	19-Oct	20-Oct	21-Oct
SoH E	1	2	0	0	1	1	0
SoH W	1	1	0	2	1	1	0
SoH Total	2	3	0	2	2	2	0
BAM NW	3	9	2	11	2	6	4
BAM SE	6	3	12	8	7	6	7
BAM Total	9	12	12	19	9	12	11


* Metrics are drawn from two separate sources: S&P Maritime / SeaVision data reflecting non-facilitated vessel traffic above 1,000 deadweight tons, excluding vessels calling Iranian ports adjacent to the Strait of Hormuz.

UKMTO transits





UKMTO Strait of Hormuz – Latest incidents



UKMTO VRA AIS Anomalies



Non-Geofeasible AIS Positions 30-Day Hexbin Aggregation ICOD: 22/10/26 00:01UTC



Non-Geofeasible AIS Positions 7-Day Hexbin Aggregation ICOD: 22/10/26 00:01UTC