# Joint Maritime Information Center

## Update 110 to JMIC Advisory Note:
## 01 March – 01 November 2026

Regional Tension - Impact on Maritime Security

**Area of Concern:**

Middle East Maritime Region

JMIC# 001-26 ICOD: 011300 UTC Regional Threat Level: SEVERE

### 1. Confirmed Maritime Security Incidents List since last report

| Date | Vessel | Vessel Type | Event Type | Location | Narrative |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 29 Oct 2026 UKMTO 186-26<br><br>30 Oct 2026 NAVAREA IX 420/26 | RITI | Tanker | Attack | Strait of Hormuz | UKMTO received a report that on 29 Oct a tanker, identified by the Royal Navy of Oman as the RITI, was struck by an unknown projectile while transiting the SOH outbound IVO Khasab, Oman; a small fire ignited and was extinguished and the vessel lost propulsion. Crew reported safe; no environmental impact reported. NAVAREA IX 420/26 reported the oil tanker anchored approx. 1 NM northwest of Ra's Tahir. |
| 29 Oct 2026 UKMTO 187-26 | LOUISE 1 | Crude oil tanker | Attack | Strait of Hormuz | UKMTO received a report that on 29 Oct a tanker, identified by India's Minister of Ports, Shipping & Waterways as the LOUISE 1, was approached approx. 25 NM northeast of Khasab, Oman, by a small boat which attached two explosive devices to the hull above the waterline; the resulting blasts caused an engine-room fire that temporarily disabled the vessel. Crew reported as safe, no environmental impact reported; the vessel continued its voyage. |
| 30 Oct 2026 UKMTO 188-26 | AL MAYEDA | LNG carrier | Attack | Arabian Gulf | UKMTO received a report that on 30 Oct an LNG carrier, identified by India's Minister of Ports, Shipping & Waterways as the AL MAYEDA, was struck by projectiles approx. 40 NM south of Lavan Island, Iran, causing a fire on board. Crew reported as safe. |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **30 Oct 2026<br>UKMTO 189-26** | **ARZANAH** | **VLCC** | **Attack** | **Strait of Hormuz** | **UKMTO received a report that on 28 Oct a VLCC, identified by India's Minister of Ports, Shipping & Waterways as the ARZANAH, was struck by an unknown projectile while transiting outbound through the Strait of Hormuz; the vessel was damaged. Crew reported as safe.** |
| **30 Oct 2026<br>MSCIO 160/26** | **Unknown** | **Unknown** | **Suspicious Activity** | **Gulf of Aden** | **On 30 October MSCIO reported that a fast skiff with four persons on board, reportedly fitted with a mounted machine gun, approached a merchant vessel to approx. 300 m approx. 50 NM south of Aden before aborting when the embarked armed security team displayed weapons (MSCIO 160/26).** |
| **30 Oct 2026<br>MSCIO 161/26<br><br>31Oct 2026<br>UKMTO 190-26** | **AZINI** | **Fishing vessel** | **Suspicious activity** | **Somali Basin** | **MSCIO & UKMTO received a report that on 29 Oct a large fishing vessel, identified by MSCIO as the AZINI, had been boarded and taken by armed persons east-southeast of Socotra. Suspected Pirate Action Group activity.** |

# 2. Operational Summary – Last 72 Hours

### 2A. Arabian Gulf

One attack was reported in this period (UKMTO 188-26). This is the sixth attack inside the Arabian Gulf since 07 October and the first in the central Gulf in this period; no further disruptions were reported.

Traffic flows continued, with anchorage congestion high across the region.

### 2B. Strait of Hormuz

Three attacks were reported in this period (UKMTO 186-26, 187-26 and 189-26). From 28-29 October three vessels were attacked off Musandam. Confirmed attacks since 06 October total 18.

IRGC attacks, attempted attacks, and/or harassment activity persisted including UAV overflight, targeted surveillance of merchant shipping, and occasional VHF hailing. These actions continue to demonstrate Iran’s intent to assert presence along key transit lanes and maintain pressure on transiting vessels.

Commercial traffic through the Strait of Hormuz remained at reduced levels compared to the 2025 baseline. Independent tracking data indicated single digit transits, while US NCAGS data indicated US assisted transits averaging approximately 39 vessel transits over the last 72 hours.

### 2C. Gulf of Oman

No confirmed attacks or disruptions were reported in this period.

Naval presence remained elevated due to blockade enforcement activity. According to the latest official CENTCOM figures (01 Nov), 144 commercial vessels had been redirected; four vessels had been disabled as a result of blockade enforcement, and two had been boarded for blockade compliance. No further CENTCOM blockade enforcement action was announced in this period.

On 28 Oct JMIC Advisory Note 016-26 (Blockade Enforcement) relayed the USNAVCENT NCAGS notice that the United States is enforcing a blockade of all Iranian ports and advising vessels of documentation needed to expedite processing of clearance requests upon screening.

Vessels were expected to respond promptly to military queries and maintain AIS-on unless constrained by security threats. Operators continued to exercise caution due to regional strike activity and ongoing IRGC monitoring of shipping in adjacent waters.

**2D. Arabian Sea (No change)**

No confirmed attacks or disruptions were reported in this period. Naval forces continued routine patrols, and commercial traffic was transiting without significant disruption.

**2E. Gulf of Aden**

One incident of suspicious activity was reported in this period (MSCIO 160/26). This follows the suspected Pirate Action Group reported on 28 October (UKMTO 184-26; NAVAREA IX 416/26, in force until 03 November). On 30 October, Yemen's government military spokesperson reported Houthi ballistic missile attacks targeting Aden International Airport and Al-Maashiq Presidential Palace. Explosions were reported; damage, casualties and effects on shipping or Aden port operations remain unverified.

Commercial traffic remained relatively steady in the Gulf of Aden.

**2F. Southern Red Sea & Bab el Mandeb**

No confirmed attacks or disruptions were reported in this period. Traffic remains below the 20 July Houthi selective embargo. Commercial traffic in the Bab el Mandeb was broadly stable, at approx. 35 transits per day on AIS tracking.

Bab el-Mandeb remains open to commercial traffic but is considered as volatile. Houthi statements continue to assert that non-Saudi commercial shipping may transit safely.

**2G. Somali Coast and Somali Basin**

One incident of suspicious activity was reported in this period (MSCIO 161/26, UKMTO 190-26). MSCIO reported that the fishing vessel was hijacked by armed pirates off northeastern Somalia on 29 October and assessed that it could be used as a mother ship (MSCIO 161/26). One merchant vessel remains hijacked since the date of initial incident reporting:

- MT ASANA, a Tanzanian-flagged product/chemical tanker, was hijacked on 17 July 2026 approximately 65 NM southwest of Mukalla, Yemen, while carrying oil products.

**2H. Northern Red Sea & Suez Canal (No change)**

No confirmed attacks or disruptions were reported in this period. Maritime traffic in the Northern Red Sea and Suez Canal held steady over the last 72 hours.

**2I. Eastern Mediterranean (No change)**

No confirmed attacks or disruptions were reported in this period. This is consistent with the persistent baseline.

## 3. Regional Threat Overview

**JMIC Threat Scale: Low | Moderate | Substantial | Severe | Critical**

| Region | Threat Level | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Arabian Gulf | SUBSTANTIAL | Due to recent Iranian attacks, the threat level in the Arabian Gulf remains SUBSTANTIAL. Navigation interference has also increased. An attack is a strong possibility. |
| Strait of Hormuz | SEVERE | Due to recent Iranian attacks, the threat level remains SEVERE, with deliberate hostile action considered as highly likely under current conditions. Navigation interference persists, and mariners are advised to remain vigilant for attempted mining within and adjacent to the TSS. IRGC attacks, hailing, and routing pressure continue, particularly for AIS-on vessels. |
| Gulf of Oman | MODERATE | The U.S. naval blockade remains enforced, with ongoing monitoring, hailing, and verification queries, particularly near approaches to Iranian ports. Enforcement activity poses no direct impact to neutral shipping transits in the Gulf of Oman. Electronic interference continues to present a credible concern for mariners. |
| Arabian Sea | MODERATE | Residual conflict-linked risk persists, but no attacks have been reported, and current indicators suggest no imminent change to the threat environment. |
| Gulf of Aden | SUBSTANTIAL | Due to piracy-related events and Houthi rhetoric and attacks, the threat level remains SUBSTANTIAL, with a strong possibility of a maritime security incident in coastal approaches, transit corridors, and established small-craft areas. |
| Bab el-Mandeb / Southern Red Sea | SUBSTANTIAL | Due to Houthi attacks on vessels and maritime infrastructure in the Southern Red Sea and territorial gains in Yemen along the Red Sea, the threat level remains SUBSTANTIAL. Based on the recent attacks, sustained intent against Saudi-affiliated interests, and maintained capability, additional attacks are a strong possibility |
| Somali Coast / Somali Basin | MODERATE | PAG activity remains possible; the southwest monsoon subsided on 15 October, and skiff operations further offshore are more feasible. |
| Northern Red Sea / Suez Canal | MODERATE | Suez Canal operations remain normal. Periodic Electro-magnetic Interference (EMI) remains possible. |
| Eastern Mediterranean | LOW | Due to a lack of security incidents, the threat level remains LOW. Localized EMI disruptions persist, and regional naval presence remains consistent. |

## JMIC Regional Threat Levels

| Threat Level | Definition |
|---|---|
| Low | An attack is highly unlikely |
| Moderate | An attack is possible but not likely |
| Substantial | An attack is a strong possibility |
| Severe | An attack is highly likely |
| Critical | An attack is almost certain |

# 4. Maritime Incidents & Traffic Assessment

### 4A. Confirmed Vessel Incidents since 01 March

Total of 167 incidents since 01 March; six incidents since the last report (UKMTO 186-26, 187-26, 188-26, 189-26, 190-26 and MSCIO 160/26). The total includes all incident types listed in Table 1 (attacks, suspicious activity and suspicious approaches), not only attacks.

### 4B. Infrastructure Incidents (Last 72 Hours)

The overall risk remains MODERATE, driven by the potential for an increase in kinetic activity against ports, terminals and offshore installations along the Iranian, Yemeni and Saudi coasts.

No attack on ports, terminals, offshore platforms, oil and gas loading facilities or subsea infrastructure was reported in this period.

### 4C. Traffic Trends

- Strait of Hormuz:
    - Historical average: ~138 vessels/day (2025 baseline)
    - U.S. – facilitated SoH transits 29-31 October (past 72 hours): 119

** Metrics are drawn from two separate sources: U.S. NCAGS data reflecting U.S.-facilitated Strait of Hormuz transits only, and S&P Maritime/SeaVision data reflecting non-facilitated vessel traffic for cargo-carrying vessels above 1,000 deadweight tons, excluding vessels calling Iranian ports adjacent to the Strait of Hormuz.*


- Bab el-Mandeb:
    - Historical average: ~61 vessels/day (2023 baseline)
    - Vessel transits  29-31 October (past 72 hours): 106

** Metrics are drawn from S&P Maritime for cargo-carrying vessels above 1,000 deadweight tons.*

### 4D. Port & Anchorage Congestion

Congestion remains high and is driven primarily by restricted transit, and to a lesser degree by port capacity. On 01 November approximately 175 vessels were at anchor in the vicinity of Fujairah/Khor Fakkan, approximately 153 off Dubai/Jebel Ali to Ras Al Khaimah, mainly off Sharjah/Ajman/Umm Al Quwain, approximately 57 in the vicinity of Musandam/Sohar and approximately 29 off Bandar Abbas/Qeshm according to internal estimates.

There was no mass departure, new cluster or gap near an attack area; the anchorages remained steady, within the normal range. Approximately 490 vessels were waiting outside the Strait of Hormuz on 01 November, against single-digit to low double-digit AIS-visible transits per day; thus, the backlog is expected to persist. Data limits: internal AIS estimates; AIS-dark vessels excluded.




Source: MarineTraffic, visual estimate; stationary commercial vessels (tanker, cargo, tug/special, high-speed, unspecified). Data cut-off 01 Nov 2026 1415 Bahrain (1115Z). *Low confidence. Change compares snapshots 29 Oct 1415 and 01 Nov 1415 Bahrain

### 4E. GNSS / AIS Interference

GNSS interference in the Arabian Gulf rose again on 30 October, back towards the 23–25 October level, concentrated along the UAE coast from Abu Dhabi to Ras Al Khaimah and the Saudi/Bahrain coast near Dammam, the same areas as earlier in October. Windward recorded 174 jammed vessels of 6,757 transmitting in the Gulf and Gulf of Oman on 29 October, 48% below its 7-day average, confirming continued but reduced effects on shipping. UKMTO's weekly VRA report (week ending 30 October) recorded four vessel GNSS reports, up from one the week before. The Strait of Hormuz remained at the established baseline, and the Gulf of Oman was marginal.

In the Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb, no significant GNSS interference was observed at sea; aircraft data showed limited indications on the Saudi coast.

No new specific UKMTO, MARAD, NAVCENT, or NAVAREA IX GNSS/EMI notices were issued 29 – 31 October. Baseline advisories remain in force.

## 5. Outlook (24–48 Hours)

### 5A. Arabian Gulf

The threat level remains SUBSTANTIAL, with continued navigational system interference and demonstrated kinetic threat and wider regional military activity continued to warrant caution.

Outlook: six attacks inside the Gulf since 07 October, including the 30 October attack on a vessel south of Lavan Island (UKMTO 188-26), show that attacks remain a strong possibility throughout the Arabian Gulf, including the central Gulf, anchorages and STS areas. Electronic interference, which rose again on 30 October, presents a credible concern in the central and southern Arabian Gulf. The operating environment requires heightened situational awareness throughout all approaches.

Vessels stationary for extended periods, or maintaining AIS-on while static, may face elevated targeting risk.

### 5B. Strait of Hormuz

The threat level remains SEVERE, with deliberate attacks considered highly likely under current conditions.

Outlook: Maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz is expected to remain at reduced levels, compared to the 2025 baseline, across both the northern Iranian-controlled route and the southern Omani corridor. Operator caution should continue, driven by a series of vessel attacks, ongoing

U.S. blockade enforcement, and elevated regional tension.Vessels transiting with AIS-on can expect elevated targeting risk and receive directed hails instructing them to divert toward the northern Iranian-controlled route.

The U.S. blockade of Iranian ports continues to be enforced. Unauthorized entry or departure may result in interception or force. Neutral transit is permitted, but vessels should expect visit-and-search checks, strong U.S. naval presence, persistent IRGC monitoring, and increased VHF hails. A 30 NM standoff from U.S. units is advised to reduce misidentification risk.

A vetted humanitarian-cargo exemption remains in place but requires submission to NAVCENT NCAGS. Approved vessels may transit to Iranian ports but remain subject to inspection and may not load cargo in Iran beyond fuel and stores.

Industry Guidance for Safe Management of Vessel Transit through the Strait of Hormuz:
*https://www.maritimeglobalsecurity.org/media/vkaa3pjr/2026-05-20-guidance-strait-of-hormuz.pdf*

**5C. Gulf of Oman**

The threat level remains MODERATE. Vessels can expect persistent IRGC monitoring and routing pressure in western portion of the Gulf of Oman; however, further east/south, attacks are considered possible but not likely. Residual risk diminishes with distance from the primary concentration of IRGC activity and with distance from Musandam / Jask.

Outlook: approximately 175 vessels are at anchor in the vicinity of Fujairah/Khor Fakkan and congestion is expected to persist. Neutral vessels between non-Iranian ports may be questioned, visited and searched under the blockade and should be prepared to provide the documentation noted in JMIC Advisory Note 016-26 to expedite clearance.

A U.S. naval blockade remains enforced, with ongoing monitoring, hailing, and verification queries, particularly near approaches to Iranian ports. Unauthorized entry or departure may result in interception or force. Neutral transit is permitted, but vessels should expect visit-and-search checks, strong U.S. naval presence, persistent IRGC monitoring, and occasional hails. A 30 NM standoff from U.S. units is advised, as well as ensuring continuous monitoring of VHF Channel 16, to reduce misidentification risk.

Electronic interference continues to present a credible concern. The operating environment requires heightened situational awareness throughout all approaches.

**5D. Arabian Sea (No change)**

The threat level remains MODERATE. The regional posture remains stable, with no confirmed maritime attacks reported. Residual risk persists due to broader regional tensions; an attack is possible but not likely, and current indicators do not suggest any shift toward increased threat levels in the near term.

Outlook: no attack was reported in this period; further interaction with military forces enforcing the blockade is possible, and no change is expected.

**5E. Gulf of Aden**

The threat level remains SUBSTANTIAL. Attacks and piracy-related activity remain a strong possibility in the Gulf of Aden and IRTC. Small-craft groups retain close-approach capability, and Pirate Action Groups can still board and divert merchant vessels as monsoon restrictions ease.

Outlook: the 30 Oct approach by an armed skiff approx. 50 NM south of Aden (MSCIO 160/26) is the third report of suspicious small craft near merchant vessels in the Gulf of Aden since 17 Oct (UKMTO 176-26; UKMTO 184-26), and further approaches are likely in the western Gulf of Aden and the IRTC, where NAVAREA IX 416/26 remains in force until 03 Nov. In both the 17 and 30

Oct approaches the skiff broke off after the embarked armed security team responded; MSCIO continues to advise strict adherence to BMP-MS. The Yemeni government reported Houthi ballistic missile fire at Aden International Airport and the Al-Maashiq Presidential Palace on 30 Oct, following a strike on the airport on 28 Oct; no impact on shipping or the port of Aden has been reported, but further strikes on Aden are likely. The southwest monsoon withdrew on 15 Oct and no cyclone development is expected over the Arabian Sea in the coming week; sea state across the Gulf of Aden is forecast to remain slight, with significant wave heights below 1 m and easterly winds below 15 kt throughout. These conditions remain favourable for skiff operations across the Gulf of Aden and the IRTC.

**5F. Southern Red Sea / Bab el Mandeb (No change)**

The threat level remains SUBSTANTIAL. Houthi messaging consistently frames the 20 July maritime blockade as selective against assets considered as Israeli-, Saudi-, or Yemeni internationally recognized government-linked. Houthi forces retain coastal presence and strike capability along the southern Red Sea approaches following September territorial gains. Saudi-backed Yemeni government forces launched a counter-offensive in early October and have claimed gains in the Bab el-Mandeb approaches; the precise extent of control remains still contested and unverified by independent sources.

Outlook: no confirmed attack on shipping was reported in this period; the last confirmed Houthi attack on a merchant vessel was on 24 August. Retaliatory action against Saudi-, Israeli- or Yemeni government-linked shipping remains possible. Houthi long-range missile and drone capability against the waterway is assessed as retained despite limited government gains. Attacks in the wider area remain a strong possibility but expansion into indiscriminate targeting of all commercial shipping remains unlikely. Traffic will continue at reduced but stable levels.

Mariners should maintain heightened security postures, implement speed and timing mitigation, minimize predictable AIS behavior in the narrows, and prepare for short-notice navigational directives.

**5G. Somali Coast and Somali Basin**

The threat level remains MODERATE as PAG activity persists across the Somali Coast and Somali Basin. The southwest monsoon withdrew on 15 Oct. Residual opportunistic piracy risk persists in nearshore Somali waters and the Gulf of Aden, where small-boat activity remains feasible. Pirate Action Groups retain the capability to board and divert merchant vessels along the Somali coast, IRTC approaches, and adjacent Gulf of Aden lanes.

Outlook: the hijack of the fishing vessel AZINI by armed pirates off northeastern Somalia on 29 October (UKMTO 190-26 / MSCIO 161/26), which MSCIO reported approaching the maritime traffic lane and assessed could be used as a mother ship, indicates that Pirate Action Group range is likely to extend across the northern Somali Basin towards the shipping routes east and south of Socotra; approaches to merchant vessels further offshore are a possibility. Sea state in the Somali Basin is forecast to remain slight, with no significant wave heights and north-easterly winds below 15 kn. With no cyclone development expected over the Arabian Sea, these conditions remain favorable for skiff and mother-ship operations further offshore.

**5H. Northern Red Sea / Suez (No change)**

The threat level remains MODERATE. Periodic EMI and GNSS disruptions are likely to continue in the area.

Outlook: Minimal AIS usage at Yanbu berths and approaches is expected to persist. The Suez Canal will remain functional in both directions with no interruption.

**5I. Eastern Mediterranean (No change)**

The threat level remains LOW for security risks to merchant shipping, with localized EMI/GNSS as the principal published hazard.

Outlook: a security incident against merchant shipping is highly unlikely, and GNSS interference on the Levant coast will continue.

Naval presence remains, and vessels should maintain prudent separation from military units. No change – consistent with the persistent baseline.

# ANNEXES

## Transit comparisons

CARGO VESSELS TRANSITS COMPARISON


| Date | 25-Oct | 26-Oct | 27-Oct | 28-Oct | 29-Oct | 30-Oct | 31-Oct |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| SoH E | 1 | 2 | 0 | 2 | 3 | 3 | **3** |
| SoH W | 0 | 1 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 1 | **1** |
| **SoH Total** | **1** | **3** | **2** | **2** | **3** | **4** | **4** |
| BAM NW | 13 | 12 | 7 | 3 | 4 | 8 | **23** |
| BAM SE | 5 | 7 | 8 | 1 | 12 | 16 | **10** |
| **BAM Total** | **18** | **19** | **15** | **4** | **16** | **24** | **33** |


TANKERS (ALL TYPES) TRANSITS COMPARISON

| Date | 25-Oct | 26-Oct | 27-Oct | 28-Oct | 29-Oct | 30-Oct | 31-Oct |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| SoH E | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | **2** |
| SoH W | 1 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | **2** |
| **SoH Total** | **1** | **2** | **0** | **1** | **2** | **0** | **4** |
| BAM NW | 8 | 7 | 4 | 1 | 5 | 5 | **7** |
| BAM SE | 3 | 13 | 1 | 0 | 5 | 3 | **8** |
| **BAM Total** | **11** | **20** | **5** | **1** | **10** | **8** | **15** |


** Metrics are drawn from two separate sources: S&P Maritime / SeaVision data reflecting non-facilitated vessel traffic above 1,000 deadweight tons, excluding vessels calling Iranian ports adjacent to the Strait of Hormuz.*

## UKMTO transits Updated 29 Oct






## UKMTO Strait of Hormuz – Latest incidents Updated 29 Oct



## UKMTO VRA AIS Anomalies Updated 29 Oct




Non-Geofeasible AIS Positions 30-Day Hexbin Aggregation ICOD: 29/10/26 00:01UTC



Non-Geofeasible AIS Positions 7-Day Hexbin Aggregation ICOD: 29/10/26 00:01UTC